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Abstract1 
 
This paper discusses movements created, initiated and maintained by 
political parties: a quite neglected area of social movement studies. 
Between 2010 and 2014, the biggest demonstrations were pro-
government marches in Hungary. The engine of pro-government 
actions was the movement of the Civil Cooperation Forum (CCF) 
implicitly founded by the incumbent party Fidesz – Hungarian Civic 
Alliance. The purpose of this article is to analyze this relationship 
within a constructivist analytical framework. Through intertextual 
analyses I will draw up the narrative of the movement focusing on four 
key challenges (constructing identity, strategic visions, organizational 
tactics, appropriate and persuading communication). I will 
demonstrate how independent the movement is. After the descriptive 
case study, two hypotheses will be generated about the political 
parties’ reason for launching a movement entrepreneurship; and the 
citizens’ motivation for participating and expressing their preferences 
between elections through a collateral organization like CCF. 
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Introduction 
 
Between 2010 and 2014, the biggest demonstrations in Hungary were pro-government 
marches. Such activism2 is particularly striking in contrast to experiences from 
Western European countries, where the number of party-sponsored protests is 
relatively low; however it is not decreasing. (Hutter, 2013) The centre of events was 
the movement of Civil Cooperation Forum (Civil Összefogás Fórum, CCF) created 
indirectly and implicitly by the party Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance. Thus the 
following questions have arisen immediately: How do CCF and Fidesz connect to 
each other? How was this top-down mobilization set up? 
Such movements are not easy to be conceptualized. Despite an increased 
interest in political discourses, it is surprising that so little empirical and theoretical 
research has actually been conducted on captured movements (e.g., Smith, 1976; 
Kolinsky-Patterson, 1976; Garner-Zald, 1987; Maguire, 1995; Rucht, 2006; Hutter, 
2013; Piccio, 2015). The organizations captured/initiated by parties/governments are 
usually mentioned as ‘pseudo-movements’3 (Smith, 1976: 336; e.g., labor 
unions),‘quasi-movements’4 (Kolinsky-Patterson, 1976: 12; e.g., peace movement in 
Italy), government organized non-governmental organizations (e.g., Russian youth 
movement Nashi “Ours”)5 or ‘astroturf’ (fake grassroots) organizations (e.g., Tea 
Party)6. These notions do not just have negative prejudices, but they are also too 
vague, contradictory and controversial notions to use systematically. 
The problem is rooted deeply in the distinction between “good/real” and 
“bad/fake” movements applied implicitly in social movement studies.7 The “good” 
                                                          
2 
However, top-down mobilization is not extraordinary in Hungary. The elite and intellectual movements 
had the leading role in the transition process of the country as well (Szabó, 1998). Since then the political 
parties regularly used to create or dominate the flows of mobilization in one way or another (Halmai, 
2011; Szabó, 2003; Körösényi, 2013).  
3
 Pseudo-movements are highly formalized and institutionalized, but make claims for the identity of 
movements. 
4
 Quasi-movements typically emerge from existing organizations. Due to strong institutional loyalty 
movement identity cannot develop properly. T hrough the instances of the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI) and the French Communist Party (PCF), Garner and Zald (1987: 312) highlight that the 
creation of quasi-movements typically characterizes strongly centralized parties. The Italian peace 
movement ‘could emerge only within PCI (…) support, and it was organizationally and financially 
dependent on the party’ (Maguire, 1995: 225). 
5
 The state-conformist and regime-maintaining Nashi was established in early 2005 to recreate and 
dominate the Russian civil sphere. Nashi has been mobilized against the opposition and ‘colored 
revolutions’ in Ukraine and Georgia. The organization is characterized by anti-fascism, anti-oligarchic-
capitalism, state patriotism and the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. Its connections to Kremlin are 
formalized: its members have become parliamentary deputies for United Russia, regular meetings with 
government officials, including Presidents Putin and Medvedev (Atwal, 2009; Atwal
 
and Bacon, 2012; 
Horvath, 2011; Lassila, 2011; Lee, 2013). 
6
 However, Theda Skocpol dismissed the idea that the Tea Party would be an astroturf movement, which 
is manipulated as marionettes from above by rich and powerful conservative puppet-masters (Skocpol 
and Williamson, 2012: 11-12). 
7
 References to normative bias: ‘In all fairness, most social movement theories are based on observations 
of left-wing movements; this is a broad failing of social movement research in general. Nonetheless, with 
the current growth of right-wing conservative movements in the modem era, it is perhaps especially 
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movements are fitted into a bottom-up (grassroots) perspective of the political process. 
According to the conventional view, ex-ante existing movements have three options 
for entering politics. Firstly, they could transform into political parties (movement 
parties) such as some green, new left, and feminist movements have done in the past 
(Gunther-Diamond, 2003; Kitschelt, 2006). Secondly, they could have an impact on 
established parties (on their organization and policy visions) such as ecologist, 
feminist, or single issue movements (Piccio, 2015). Finally, they could even capture a 
party (Kriesi, 2014) as the Christian Right continuously intends to do with the 
Republican Party (Green et al., 2001). In contrast, the “bad” or “populist” movements 
are a top-down phenomenon (directly or indirectly) founded and promoted by 
political or private actors (political parties or business companies) to form public 
opinions. 
Overstating theoretical conflict has highlighted that these movements need a 
comprehensive and stable conceptual ground. Sartori’s (1970) concept formation 
called “ladder of abstraction” could easily be denuded of normative boundaries. To 
create high-level categories the researcher can maximize extension and minimize 
intension of the concept. At the lower levels, (s)he can focus on the special attributes 
that make these movements different from the others.  
Avoiding the normative conceptions, the study relies on Mario Diani’s (1992) 
conceptual synthesis. I define social movements (broadly) as non-conventional, extra-
institutional and informal networks of individuals, groups and/or organizations, 
engaged in a political conflict, on the basis of shared collective identities.  
More specifically, I borrow the concept and typology of collateral organizations 
introduced by Thomas Poguntke (2005b) to describe the relationships between the 
party and other organizations. According to this party-centric perspective the parties 
use these organizations to create or recreate linkages to various groups of potential 
voters (Lawson, 1988; Poguntke, 2005a). Four types of collateral organizations are 
discerned: the independent, the corporately linked, the affiliated, and the ancillary 
organization. In Poguntke’s institutionalist approach the main differences between 
these forms are the extent of the overlapping membership and organizational 
autonomy. The difference regarding party dominated organizations is that ancillary 
organizations have dual membership in contrast to affiliated organizations, in which 
the membership is just partially overlapping. According to Poguntke’s (2005) 
framework CCF would be an affiliated or ancillary organization, even though it has 
not got either explicit organizational links to the party or minimal autonomy. Thus I 
                                                                                                                                                      
pertinent to NSM (New Social Movements) theory to account for them as well.’ (Pichardo, 1997: 413, 1. 
footnote) ‘Within the recent literature on social movements, one of the more accepted 'truths' has been 
that small citizen groups in the so-called 'new social movements' represented a social force much stronger 
than that of more established organizations.’ (Hjelmar, 1996: 177) I will follow Castells’ practice: ‘Since 
there is no sense of history other than the history we sense, from an analytical perspective there are no 
’good’ and ’bad,’ progressive and regressive social movements. They are all symptoms of who we are, and 
avenues of our transformation, since transformation may equally lead to a whole range of heavens, hells, 
or heavenly hells. (…) And yet, this is our world, this is us, in our contradictory plurality, and this is what 
we have to understand, if necessarily to face it, and to overcome it.’ (2010: 4) 
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will use Poguntke’s typology within a constructivist8 perspective (della Porta and 
Keating, 2008; Kratochwil, 2008). The difference between party dominated collateral 
organizations is the strength of the relationship. In other words: affiliated organizations 
have wider autonomy for their own actions than ancillary ones.  
In this paper, I will inquire into the CCF movement and its relation to Fidesz 
focusing on critical points to create and keep a movement alive. I expect that the CCF 
provides answers to these questions:  
 
Who are we? Who are our enemies? – Identity, “we” and “they” are 
constructed out of a fountain of fluid and amorphous myths, symbols, and 
thoughts. In this process the movement creates its own world view, which not 
necessarily reflects the real world. 
What do we want to achieve? – Strategic visions are designed by imagination. 
The main goals of the collective actions must be clear and well defined. 
How do we want to achieve it? – Organizational tactics are adapted to optimize 
the exploitation of resources. Thus the organizational forms and maneuvers 
must be suited to political competition and environment (opportunity structure). 
Why do we want to achieve it? – Persuasive communication convinces the 
citizens to participate and to identify themselves with the movements, aims, and 
means. 
 
The uniqueness of answers formulated by CCF shows the movement’s independence 
from Fidesz. In other words: the more freely the movement creates its own world, the 
greater distance the movement can keep from the political party to act in the name of 
the party. From another direction, if the movement does not have its own answers or 
the decisive will to give its own answers, the movement will be more integrated in the 
party’s background. Consequently, the movement can act only with the party. 
I will focus on the movement’s narratives (Polletta, 1998) and the world they 
have created, believed in and not on the interpretation of outsiders who might have 
opposing interests. The analysis of these activities relies on four types of evidence: 
publications (Civil Ethical Codex, CEC and National Social Contract, NSC), 
speeches, interviews, and general news found on the website of CCF 
(civilosszefogas.hu, ca. 540 posts between 2009 and 2015). The CEC is a general 
ethical collection for “national” civil society, which includes general instructions for 
collective action. The NSC is the product of personal and national consultations and 
civil recommendations. Both books are sponsored by the National Cooperation Fund 
(Hungarian governmental civil fund) and the Foundation for a Civic Hungary (a 
foundation of Fidesz).  
Finally due to negligence of this topic bordered by social movement and 
political party studies, the descriptive case study induces two theoretical problems: 
Why would an incumbent party form a new enterprise in an extra-institutional arena? 
What leads citizens to express their preferences between elections through a collateral 
                                                          
8
 The constructivist approach is not new in movement studies (See, inter alia, Oliver, Jorge and Strawm, 
2003: 225-234.; Hjelmar, 1996; Castells, 2010). 
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organization? The case study generates two hypotheses to provide possible answers to 
these questions. I interpret this entrepreneurship as a form of “consent mobilization” 
(Beer, 1992), which is not a new strategy just an unconventional, extra-parliamentary 
one. In addition, I assume that the activists’ motivations come from their partisan 
commitment and identity (Flesher Fominaya, 2010; Klandermans, 2014; Polletta and 
Jasper, 2001) rather than material incentives.  
The paper is presented in five sections. Section 1 highlights the characteristics 
of CCF’s movement identity. Section 2 discusses their goals, claims, and 
policy/politics/polity changes. Section 3 shows the movement’s organizational 
challenges, internal solutions and external linkages. Section 4 inquires into the 
communication that persuades the supporters to identify themselves with the 
movement, to accept the strategic visions and organizational tactics of the movement 
Section 5 takes into account the limitations and implications of the research while also 
offering two theoretical propositions about movement entrepreneurship of parties and 
the motivation of activists.  
 
The case of CCF 
Who are we? Who are the others? 
 
Establishing identity is always a dual activity. It includes not just the question of “who 
are we?” but also the question of “who are the others?”. The CCF has paid particular 
attention to constructing a community aiming to embody the “real” civil society, the 
people, and nation who govern.  
 
We are the “real” civil society 
 
The CCF was built on a decentralized mass movement of Civic Circles (polgári körök) 
founded directly by Fidesz to reorganize and extend the party’s background after the 
lost elections in 2002 (Halmai, 2011). Since its foundation in 2009, the movement of 
CCF aims to strengthen the Hungarian civil society, represent its interests and values. 
Due to the bottom-up image, political parties and profit-oriented organizations cannot 
join and the promotion of any other political movement or political party is not 
tolerated in protest events (civilosszefogas.hu, 3.5.2009).9
 
In the narrative of the movement, civil society is the driving force behind 
democracy and a synonym for freedom. Independent from other sectors, civil society 
seeks to balance between political, economic actors and society. They control the 
state, but protect the state from outsiders (multinational corporations and European 
Union) as well. However, CCF is not just a member of civil society. It claims to be 
civil society itself to coordinate and mobilize the civil society. 
For CCF, being civil or civic means being communitarian “citoyen”, “patriotic” 
and not individualist bourgeoisie. Thus the movement expects a complete 
metamorphosis of individuals: 
                                                          
9
 https://civilosszefogas.hu/nemzetstrategia-kell-es-uj-alkotmany (Accessed: 30-01-2015) 
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‘The key is in the man. The individual man must rise up against himself, and if 
he has freed himself from shackles of his soul, he must join to the others – this 
is what is called soul exchange today.' [Italics added] (civilosszefogas.hu, 
22.03.2010)10
 
 
In this sense, civil society is based on active participation, duty for the community and 
moral steadfastness. This is what the movement calls “civilitics” (civilitika), which 
means civil politics. 
In contrast, the oppositional NGOs are not considered true civilians by the 
group, because they are much closer to the sphere of politics. 
 
‘It is also likely, that the organizations, who define themselves as civil so far, will 
explicitly enter onto the stage of politics and run for elections as parties. The 
question is if such civil organizations are real civilians, in other words if they are 
independent form professional politics (…). The answer is Janus-faced: on the 
one hand the laws allow for the so-called social organizations to become parties 
at any time (…). On the other hand, however, these organizations are 
presumably founded with the secret goal to transform into a party with an ideal 
timing after assessment of their strength and networking.’ (CEC, 2012: 66) 
 
“Fake” civilians’ behavior is characterized by individual ambitions and a constant 
struggle for power. In contrast, “real” civilians deal with true, pure and important 
public issues. CCF asked the left-wing movement called Milla (Egymillióan a magyar 
sajtószabadságért, One Million for Press Freedom) not to believe in economic and 
political interest groups and join CCF. After the movement (Milla) was captured by 
the former Prime Minister (PM) Gordon Bajnai the picture has changed dramatically: 
 
‘From where could the slogan of “people have been disillusioned with parties” 
be familiar? At a time, a Nazi leader called Hitler had come to power in such a 
way, that he was always saying that over and over again. The fake civil overture 
before the announcement of forming a party evokes associations, because Mr. 
Bajnai also began with attacking parties.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 01.21.2013)11 
 
According to their narrative the anti-government protesters are hired as soldiers, 
partisans, rivals of democracy, to support failing politicians to regain power. Their 
activism sponsored by foreign funds (Soros Foundation, EEA–Norway Grants) gives 
only rise to panic and permanent hysteria in the name of overthrowing the 
government. 
 
  
                                                          
10
 https://civilosszefogas.hu/lelekcserelo-idok-jarnak (Accessed: 30-01-2015) 
11
 https://civilosszefogas.hu/bajnai-bruesszeli-markaboltja (Accessed: 30-01-2015) 
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We are the people, the nation, who governs. 
 
“Let the people decide!” – sounded the call, when the Bajnai cabinet was set up in 
2009 due to a constructive vote of no confidence. Substantially the movement as the 
only representative of civil society has the privilege to negotiate with the government. 
‘Cooperation of the government and the people is such as the leaven in the bread.’ 
(civilosszefogas.hu, 07.02.2012)12 For instance, Zsolt Semjén (leader of the Christian 
Democratic People's Party, minister without portfolio and Deputy Prime Minister) 
signed the first Social Contract on behalf of the newly formed government in 2010. 
After the ratification of a new constitution (called Basic Law) in 2011, CCF saluted the 
members of parliament (MPs), who supported the new constitution. They also 
engaged in some consultations with ministers delineating suggestions gathered from 
civil society. In addition, they explicitly support the government’s official public 
consultations (postal questionnaires). 
Even though the movement expects organizational independency from civil 
society, they have repeatedly emphasized that being a civil actor does not necessarily 
entail being neutral as well. 
 
‘Despite the naturally existing party sympathies the NGO undertakes his civil, 
civic nature (…) [But] being civil is not used as a springboard to become a party. 
(…) [T]his independence does not mean partisan neutrality: the party sympathy 
confessed by the organization is not a sin, but openness, a virtue.’ (CEC, 2012: 
13)  
‘The civilian is not a party soldier, for individual and communal interests do not 
contract to the applying functions of parties and government.’ (CEC, 2012: 15) 
 
However, the movement signed a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of 
Administration and Justice, the Ministry of Agriculture, and with some grocery and 
general merchandise retailer chains as well (CBA, Coop). Moreover CCF received 
financial support of 40 million HUF from the Foundation for a Civic Hungary to 
strengthen the citizens’ cooperation. The movement declared explicitly, that such 
support contributes to a common purpose of both sides and so they cannot be 
expected to be self-limiting in giving and using such support. 
 
‘Support for the civilians is a general thesis: the subvention is equally important 
for both the proponent and those who are being supported. Who gives – does 
so with an explicit purpose and it aims to fulfill the publicly formulated and 
approved programs. Who receives – deserved it, and demonstrated capability 
and reliability previously. It is not charity. Under no circumstances could it 
mean the self-conditioning gesture of the promoter. The support is clearly a 
defined and self-imposed goal for both of them.’ (CEC, 2012: 85) 
 
                                                          
12
 https://civilosszefogas.hu/cet-sajtokoezlemeny-a-patriota-europa-mozgalom-bejelenteserl (Accessed: 30-
01-2015) 
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The government’s critics from inside or outside of the country became adversaries of 
the movement as well. Despite the fact that at the elections of 2010 Fidesz won a two-
third super majority, CCF declared clearly that the battle is won but the war is far from 
over yet. Later, the war narrative became permanent: ‘Our troops are at war’ 
(civilosszefogas.hu, 26.05.2011).13 They have fought against rival MPs, other 
politicians, or former PMs. Two “self-defense and educational” campaigns were 
addressed directly at them: 
 
‘They have ruined the country together’ – the poster shows former PMs 
Gyurcsány and Bajnai supported by the Hungarian Socalist Party (Magyar 
Szocialista Párt, MSZP) which alludes to Bajnai’s new political formation 
(Together 2014). 
‘They deserve no more chances’ – the CCF campaigned with this slogan in the 
parliamentary elections of 2014. The poster shows Gyurcsány, Bajnai, Attila 
Mesterházy (the leader of MSZP at that time) and Miklós Hagyó (former 
deputy mayor of Budapest and member of the Parliament, who was arrested on 
suspicion of extortion and breach of fiduciary responsibility) as prisoners with a 
clown. 
 
Similarly, the biggest demonstrations of CCF have been the multiple Peace Marches 
(Békemenet) with slogans on its lead banners like:  
 
‘We are not going to be a colony!’ (January 21, 2012, Budapest) – Reference to 
the Orbán government’s conflicts with the International Monetary Fund and the 
European Union (estimated attendance: max. 400,000). 
‘We Will Not Remain Debtors—The Homeland Is One!’ (October 23, 2012, 
Budapest) – Reference to paying off the 2008 emergency loan from the 
International Monetary Fund and exiting the European Union’s Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (estimated attendance: max. 400,000). 
‘Bajnai - Gyurcsány: Together They Destroyed the Country!’  (February 5, 
2013, Gyula) – Reference to the former left-wing PM Ferenc Gyurcsány and 
Gordon Bajnai supported by MSZP (estimated attendance: max. 30,000). 
‘Those Who Are Aggressive Are Frightened. We Are Not Frightened!’ 
(October 23, 2013, Budapest) – Reference to incidents of breaking a model 
statue of PM Viktor Orban (similarly to pulling down a Stalin statue during the 
1956 Hungarian Revolution) in an opposition demonstration. (estimated 
attendance: max. 400,000). 
‘The Country Is One – April 6, 2014’ (March 29, 2014, Budapest) – Reference 
to the 2014 National Assembly elections (estimated attendance: max. 
450,000).14
 
 
                                                          
13
 https://civilosszefogas.hu/ne-bantsd-a-magyart (Accessed: 30-01-2015) 
14
 For estimated attendances I used numbers given by the webpage of Peace March 
(bekemenetegyesulet.hu), which are most likely over-estimations, but show the weight of the events. For 
the estimated attendance figures in media discourses more specifically see Bene’s study (2014). 
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These messages reflected partisan and government politics explicitly. According to 
László Kövér, Speaker of the National Assembly and one of founding members of 
Fidesz, the Peace Marches defend the country. CCF cited even the PM Viktor Orbán 
‘if a few hundred thousand Hungarians did not stand at the crossing gate (…) then 
there is a possibility of not staying alive in this period.’ (NSC, 2014: 54). 
The movement was really active in defending the government from global 
actors called economic and financial oligarchies, “super empires” by CCF, and 
protecting the civil society from effects of mass media labeled as brainwashing by the 
“lackey media” by CCF. 
 
‘With occupying and invading troops camouflaged as civilians the giants of the 
bank sector built an institutional system similar to the empire of Nero, which is 
equivalent to dictatorship such as communism and Nazism.’ (CEC, 2012: 15)  
 
According to CCF, the “satanic” empires (IMF, USA, current EU, Bilderberg Group) 
take a stand against the classical view of democracy preparing modern slavery and 
trying to overthrow the Hungarian government. The movement repeatedly initiated 
negotiations with the IMF and sent open letters to several European and American 
politicians15 aiming to change their opinions about Hungarian government politics. 
The CCF does not tolerate internal enemies either. Rivalry and differences of 
opinion between members of the movement are not tolerated. More specifically, the 
movement tries to avoid the negative consequences of the “divide and conquer” 
strategy of adversaries.  
 
‘If the person cannot convince companions with rational arguments about his 
counter opinion and the others cannot gain him over to the correctness of their 
point of view. The person can stand ethically convicted of leaving the 
organization. Staying in the organization is a destructive activity, and attacking 
the organization externally because of personal grievances is unethical behavior.’ 
(CEC, 2012: 20) 
 
In a recent case this problem had arisen. The CCF posted an announcement on its 
website, in which they deprecate Gábor Bencsik, the chief editor of the pro-
government journal of Hungarian Chronicle, and organizer of the Civic Circle, and 
the Peace Marches to criticize the government and incumbent politicians’ self-
enrichment responding to the new wave of scandals: 
 
‘The CCF rejects the emerging phenomenon of the ‘Stockholm syndrome’. We 
could not have become the victim of instigating post-communist and neo-liberal 
                                                          
15
 For example José Manuel Barroso, the former President of the European Commission, Viviane 
Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, André 
Goodfriend, former Chargé d’Affaires of Embassy of the United States to Hungary, Martin Schulz, 
President of the European Parliament, and President Barack Obama. 
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world vision and value system, which is intending to take us hostage.’ 
(civilosszefogas.hu, 04.12.2014)16
 
 
What do we want to achieve? 
 
On the face of it, the CCF had a clear and detailed strategic vision in the first years. 
The movement saw that Hungarian civil society is openly “political”, therefore the 
goal was organizing a policy-centered civil sector. ‘Playing a leading role among civil 
organizations, the CCF has already stepped onto the road of policy questions.’ (CEC, 
2012: 109) In the first Social Contract17 (civilosszefogas.hu 10.09.2009)18 they declared 
six main points on what they expect from the government: 
 
1. Constitutional responsibility and accountability of the executive branch (e.g., a 
more “traditional” form of no-confidence vote). 
2. Stronger role for the current President of the Republic, who has the exclusive 
and factual right to dissolve Parliament. 
3. Commencement of preparation for a future bicameral parliament. 
4. Increasing the autonomy of local governments and ensuring the representation 
of provincialists such as civil associations in local government bodies. 
5. An Administrative Court (as a special court). 
6. Strengthening the institutions of direct democracy and disposing their 
conditions precisely. 
 
Most of these proposals (with the exception of administrative courts) have not been 
fulfilled by the government. Moreover the movement has created round tables (for 
health care, social, culture policies) to prepare policy suggestions for the government, 
but the results have not been made public. Eventually, their policy-centered (foreign 
currency loans, discriminating state language law of Slovakia, school meals etc.) 
mobilization causes have almost disappeared since 2012. 
In most of its posts the CCF emphasized actual political issues. They have not 
formulated criticism about the politics and policies of the government, even though, 
for instance, the civil sector got less financial support (Ca. 1.3 billion HUF / 4.2 
million Euro) from the state in 2012 than in former years (Ca. 3.4 billion HUF / 11 
million Euro). In contrast, when the plan of an Internet tax was withdrawn by the 
government after mass protests in 2014, one of the movement’s spokespersons (in 
fact, leaders), Tamás Fricz commented the decision: ‘Well done, Viktor Orbán!’ 
(civilosszefogas.hu, 04.11.2014)19. Essentially the movement has become reactive and 
drifted with the flow of politics. They explicitly supported István Tarlós in his two 
campaigns to be elected Major of Budapest. Moreover they support the deep 
personnel changes in the administration. All in all, the movement has lost its ability to 
                                                          
16
 https://civilosszefogas.hu/csizmadia-laszlo-a-valodi-civil-szferarol (Accessed: 30-01-2015) 
17
 The original text was not available at the time of this research work. 
18
 https://civilosszefogas.hu/a-civil-osszefogas-tarsadalmi-szerzodese (Accessed: 30-01-2015) 
19
 https://civilosszefogas.hu/fricz-tamas-bravo-orban-viktor (Accessed: 30-01-2015) 
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reach and create its own policy goals, which makes the movement’s initiatives 
subordinate to the government and Fidesz. 
 
How do we want to achieve it? 
 
The movement of CCF is well organized and well prepared to maximize the resources 
of his political environment. The movement has become the center of a network of 
protest events, actions and other organizations. They organized the previously 
mentioned Peace Marches, the Intellectual Defense of the Nation and founded the 
Civil Cooperation Conference (Civil Együttműködési Tanácskozás, CCC) and the 
Civil Cooperation Public Benefit Foundation (Civil Összefogás Közhasznú Alapítvány, 
CPBF). The CCC consists of communities of trans-border Hungarian regions and the 
CCF itself with the aim to stimulate cooperation in the Carpathian Basin. The place of 
its foundation was symbolic: the Parliament’s chamber of the former upper house in 
2011. The financial background of the CCC and CCF is provided by CPBF, which 
creates a legal personality for the movement. These organizations are not the same, 
but their activities point in the same direction. Officially, the CPBF coordinates the 
movement, but its real core is a group of CCF’s leaders. 
Moreover CCF and some right-wing Polish civil organizations founded the 
Patriotic Europe Movement in 2012 to respond to the criticism of the Hungarian 
government by EU actors. According to this movement’s credo, they are aiming to 
facilitate the Europe of values and nations instead of the power of money and the 
bureaucrats’ Europe. 
After the elections of 2014 the circumstances of pro-government actions have 
changed. Public support for the Fidesz government decreased; some new scandals 
and new waves of protest events with new anti-government (antitax) narratives arose. 
The idea of another Peace March arose among supporters of the movement, but it 
was considered ill-timed by the movement’s elite. However, it was made clear that 
Fidesz never gave any instructions not to organize a Peace March, nor to postpone 
one. Fricz and Csizmadia describe the affair in the following way. 
 
‘It is not worth it to organize a Peace March against them, because, as they say, 
eagles do not hunt flies. In the recent weeks protests organized by more or less 
civil groups have become more active indeed; their occasional violent and 
aggressive actions are deeply reprehensible. But just because of them it is not 
worth it to organize a Peace March procession. They are not an organized 
political force, even though the rest of the world tries to help them in many 
ways’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 13.11.2014).20 
‘The Peace March is the means to national sovereignty, identity and the right of 
subsidiarity. We do not intend to show off force and as light cavalry take apart 
provocation in the streets. The Peace March has won the esteem of society, its 
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power counts as ‘heavy artillery’, reasons for deploying it are determined only 
by what lies in the name of the movement.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 16.12.2014)21 
 
The movement proclaimed civil radicalism in 2009, which means the reconstruction 
of civil society as a fourth branch of government. In opposition, the movement 
opposed redefining the relationship of the state and civil society. However, after 2010 
they initiated a similar institutionalization in the civil sector. The quasi-leader of the 
movement, László Csizmadia, who has a formal/informal position in every 
organization related to CCF, became the president of the National Civil Fund, the 
Hungarian governmental civil fund, which was reorganized and renamed as the 
National Cooperation Fund in 2012. As a result, the CCF as the representative of civil 
society became institutionalized and formally connected to the state and the 
government. However, the movement was quite antagonistic toward this topic: 
 
‘[I]t must be emphasized, that the independence of the civil society has not just 
legal-constitutional, but also financial and substantive requirements as well. It’s 
important that the distributional mechanism of public funds serving civil 
organizations being neutral and transparent (…) [I]t is at least as important. The 
civil society will not became the echo of state, rather it is an independent and 
autonomous discourse with the state on shaping goals, themes, conflicts and 
dialogues of civil society.’ (CEC, 2012: 93) 
‘This is dangerous, because the civil sphere of a given country could easily turn 
from being truly independent to just formally independent, seemingly 
autonomous, but in fact, under the influence of political parties and 
governments controlling it as their tool.’ (CEC, 2012: 97) 
 
With the overlapping organizational network and institutionalized linkage to the state, 
CCF is able to utilize and monopolize the resources, (seemingly) able to maximize the 
number of reachable participants, followers, and able to give ever newer impulses to 
mobilization, which makes their campaign almost permanent. 
 
Why do we want to achieve it? 
 
At first glance, persuasive communication is the weakest point of CCF. Without any 
doubt the leaders of the movement, who are mostly political scientists, columnists or 
lawyers, are not great orators. Their mainstream communication has relied almost 
exclusively on printed media. After 2012 most of their posts were either open letters 
or essays taken from newspapers (even in scanned form). As opinion leaders, they 
focused on constructing public opinion and not the collective actions of the 
movement. 
Despite the lack of sufficient reasoning, the appropriate answer (to challenges 
of persuasive communication) is essential for keeping the movement identity alive, 
achieving its visions, and making sense of organizational tactics. The answer to the 
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“why” comes from outside of the movement. In 2010 the CCF was already eager to 
stand by the new PM: 
 
‘The new Social Contract is signed (…). He [PM Viktor Orbán] undertook to 
take the lead, and asked us to follow him. It is a serious statement, a beautiful 
and difficult pledge and much to ask for. He needs us.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 
24.06.2010)22
 
 
The party leadership and government dominated the reasoning of aforementioned 
movement activity. Previously mentioned messages of protests suited the 
communication of the party and the government. Moreover the Peace March is 
usually attached to partisan events (mass meetings, commemoration of government) 
with speeches delivered by PM Viktor or others from the top rank of the party. 
Essays, speeches and the two books of the movement were just supplementary in their 
nature and clearly not enough to mobilize. These are more likely to underline existing 
party massages rather than to create their own ones. 
 
Summary of the Findings 
 
The world is full of existent forms and ideas already created (Schabert, 2005: 242-
244). Thus complete independence and essentiality in creating an own identity, 
objectives, and organizational entity cannot be expected from any movements (and 
from parties either). They can borrow or even inherit ideas (Castells, 2010: 7) and 
organizations. In short, a movement can never truly be created freely. Even though 
movements (just like any other political actors) try to push and stretch these 
boundaries by trial and error.  
Looking at the case, CCF (seemingly) does not even try to step onto this route. 
The movement was born into the world fed by the political right wing, especially by 
Fidesz after 2002. The movement’s identity is broader than expected. Literally, the 
movement occupied the civil sphere and bridged the gap between civil society and 
government. Identity cannot change dramatically. Deciding on who is our enemy and 
friend was running in parallel with the political challenges and background of Fidesz. 
At an early stage, the movement had clear and strong initiatives, but later on their 
strategic vision served and followed government interests. Formally, dual membership 
does not exist, but the CCF has institutionalized initially and externally creating 
linkages to society and the state. Despite their dominant position, the network 
depends heavily on the government and the party. Their reasoning (persuasive 
communication) relies on partisan commitments letting the party control the 
mobilization. 
If unconventional/extra-institutional and conventional/institutional worlds exist 
as assumed by many scholars (Hutter, 2013; Joyce, 2002; Kalyvas, 2009), then the 
activities of the movement would overlap in these spheres to different extents (see 
Figure 1). The figure illustrates the construction of CCF and the stratification of the 
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relationship between the movement and the party. The movement does not have the 
opportunity and/or the proper will to be created more independently. In another 
perspective, Fidesz could stabilize and recreate, redefine its linkages to groups of 
potential voters. Moreover this border has nearly completely vanished in the narrative 
of CCF. However, the movement can act more freely in organizations and network 
building than in the other critical points; this relationship seems to be very close 
without any formal organizational connection. As a consequence of this seemingly 
inseparable relationship, the movement stands closer to ancillary organizations than to 
affiliated ones.  
 
 
Figure 1: The stratification of relationship between Fidesz and CCF 
 
Discussion 
 
In this descriptive case study, I made an attempt to investigate the top-down relations 
of Fidesz and CCF through four activities. My questions were: How do CCF and 
Fidesz connect to each other? How was this top-down mobilization set up? The 
research relied on analysis of texts and documents published by the movement to 
show its relations to the party and dependency or interdependency in constructing its 
actions. The results made clear that: CCF has no autonomy or enough political will to 
construct its own reality. Findings demonstrate the overlapping construction of this 
collective action, which is a more complex relationship than simple institutional 
connections. However, movements as ancillary organizations of parties could be 
extraordinary and strikingly particular; the case study shows the possible deepness of 
the relation between a party and a movement.  
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The findings implicate two theoretical problems: (1) the parties’ reason for 
launching a movement entrepreneurship of parties; (2) the citizens’ motivation for 
participating and expressing their preferences between elections through a collateral 
organization. Here, assisting future research I introduce two hypotheses to provide 
some possible explanations. 
Hypotheses No. 1: Such movement entrepreneurship of parties is a strategy for 
reconstructing their background (realignment). 
In present-day politics, which is characterized by presidentialization (Poguntke 
and Webb, 2005; Webb et al., 2012), partisan de-alignment (Dalton and Kuechler, 
1990; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), declining parties (Katz and Mair, 1995) and 
legislatures (Flinders and Kelso, 2011) the role of political movements and extra-
institutional, non-conventional political activity has become re-valuated and collective 
actions get more attention than ever before. Due to the transformation of mass parties 
into catch-all and cartel parties the conventional political actors had slowly lost the 
monopoly and ability of mobilization between elections. Simultaneously, new 
movement parties have arisen over and over again as rivals. Conventional political 
actors lack legitimacy, or their legitimacy has become more contingent and 
personalized. 
Spin-off entrepreneurship is not a new strategy. In the 1960s, Samuel H. Beer 
(1990) had already seen that the main task of conventional actors (modern politics) is 
“consent mobilization”. This idea reflects the growing political contingency (namely 
declining legislatures), the delegating legislative power to the executive, and the 
strengthening new group politics (Beer, 1990: 62-71). In short Beer asks how can 
political trust and legitimacy be restored in changing political environments 
characterized by the proliferation of new non-conventional (i.e., movement parties) 
and weakened old actors (classes, mass partisan heritages etc.). Mobilizing consent is 
more than the periodical electoral authorization, because the decisions are made after 
the elections (Beer, 1990: 76). It assumes a permanent campaign for maintaining the 
majority in the legislature and making citizens accept the politics and policies of 
government. 
The ‘vacuum’ of legitimization, contingency, which is caused by previously 
mentioned tendencies, has made consent mobilization even more intensive and 
necessary. If there are no other options for cost-effectively achieving political aims, 
political contests will easily find their way to the streets creating new formations to 
control popular consent. As conventional arenas of politics, legislatures dominated by 
parties cannot fulfill their role anymore. Thus the parties have expanded the arena 
borders by reoccupying, invading, and dominating the space (i.e., streets) which was 
abandoned by mass parties. The modern parties came from the street, why could they 
not return? 
Hypotheses No. 2: Citizens commit themselves to party captured movements 
to express their identity. 
The results show that party dominated movements and mobilizations are for 
demonstrating preferences and sympathies for a particular party. Conventionally, 
movements emerge from social or political conflicts, which directly (but not equally) 
affect citizens. Their goal is to change this situation. Without partisan interpretation, 
party dominated mobilization does not possess clearly defined conflicts and goals; 
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however, these tasks do not have primacy in this case. The already existing 
commitment and partisan identity are far more important for mobilizing people. 
Partisan slogans, badges and flags tell us that identity precedes the event. In other 
words, the participants know where and why they are going; they are already ready to 
accept the narratives about conflicts and aims. Collective identity better captures the 
pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize. Identity is an 
alternative to material incentives has become a secondary element in mobilization 
dominated by parties. 
The contingency of politics has another antecedent and consequence. From the 
side of citizens, conventional institutions lose not just legitimacy, but also the ability to 
provide collective identity (cognitions shared by members of groups) (Castells, 2010). 
Identity is usually described as a place in society. People occupy many different 
places; however ever fewer places can be shared collectively. Thus a new, alternative 
collective identity has been re-valuated. 
Identity processes play a crucial role in the dynamics of mobilization. It has 
been used extensively by social movement scholars to explain how social movements 
generate and sustain commitment and group cohesion over time. (See, inter alia, 
Fominaya, 2010; Klandermans, 2014; Polletta and Jasper, 2001) Moreover 
Klendermans (2014) shows that the more someone identifies with a group, the higher 
the chances are to take part in collective action on behalf of that group. Group 
members urge them to support and defend their group. The partisan identification 
could easily become a self-generating process. The strong identities usually implicate a 
backlash, as those portrayed as the enemy may be angered or frightened into counter 
organization. The debates are characterized by strong emotional loadings to separate 
the liked in-group and the hated out-group. Consequently, the so-called 
movement/counter-movement dynamics (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Zald and 
Useem, 1987) generated even further polarization and radicalization (as examined in 
the Hungarian case: Körösényi, 2013). 
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